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Introduction
CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY asserted that
strict products liability is a doctrine that helps consumers. The
notion of strict liability for products was first raised in California
case law in 1944 in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno.1 In
Escola, Justice Traynor reasoned that public policy required the
adoption of strict products liability because strict products liability
deters manufacturers from placing defective products on the mar-
ket, the injured victims cannot afford the cost of the harm as well
as the manufacturers who make and sell the products, proof of
negligence is difficult or impossible for the consumer to provide,
manufacturers have greater access to knowledge of the risks in-
volved in a product, and the manufacturer is better able to spread
the cost of injury by passing it along to consumers. 2 These argu-
* The authors wish to thank Professors Abby Ginsberg and Dolores A. Donovan for
reading this paper and offering insightful suggestions for its improvement. We also thank
University of San Francisco Law Review member Denise Whitehead.
** J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law (1984); Member, Vermont Bar.
1. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
2. Public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
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ments have been reiterated in subsequent California decisions3 em-
phasizing that strict products liability helps consumers because it
is less burdensome than negligence theory. Also, the public gener-
ally perceives strict liability as benefiting consumers at the expense
of manufacturers,4 in contrast with negligence law.
The California Supreme Court adopted strict products liabil-
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the mar-
keting of products having defects that are a menace to the public.
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 692-94 (5th ed. 1984) (cases from other jurisdictions supporting the
adoption of strict liability) [hereinafter cited as TORTS].
3. These arguments include: (1) Strict products liability deters manufacturers from
placing defective products on market. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 26, 142
Cal. Rptr. 612, 618 (1977) (Kane, J., dissenting); (2) Injured victims cannot afford the cost
of harm as well as manufacturers. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722,
725, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181 (1970); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63,
391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d, 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); (3) Proof of negligence is
difficult for the consumer. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162,
1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1977); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Co., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d
1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 701; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944); (4) Manufacturers have greater access to knowledge of risks involved in a
product. Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 27, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 619 (1977)
(Kane, J., dissenting); and (5) Manufacturer is better able to spread the cost by passing it
along to consumers. Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 251 n.5, 466 P.2d at 725-26 n.5, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-
82 n.5; Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
23-24 (1965); Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
4. In 1984, the Senate Commerce Committee approved a bill that would require proof
of negligence in product liability cases before a manufacturer could be found liable. This
prohibition of strict products liability was reported as a pro-manufacturer measure. See
Saddler, Bill Limiting Firms' Liability Gains in Senate, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1984, at 2, col.
2. A study of 1984 product liability cases in California showed that plaintiffs prevailed in
46% of the 136 cases decided by juries and that those winners received lower awards than
plaintiffs in previous years. See Milstein, Lower Awards in Products Suits, San Francisco
Chron., Feb. 6, 1985, at 6, col. 1. This study suggests that plaintiff's prospect of victory at
trial is less than 50%. Plaintiff's success at trial, therefore, is hardly a foregone conclusion.
The preference for negligence as a basis of liability is not necessarily limited to manu-
facturers. Plaintiff lawyers may prefer negligence as a basis of liability. "In McLuhanesque
terms negligence is 'hot' and strict liability is 'cold.''" Rheingold, The Expanding Liability
of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 531 (1974). Plaintiff attorneys
may seek to prove gross negligence in order to win a punitive damage award.
[Vol. 19
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ity in 1963 as a basis of liability in cases where consumers were
injured by products.5 Justice Traynor wrote: "a manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'
In its decision the court established the requirements of defect
and causation as central to the injured plaintiff's prima facie case
of strict products liability. 7 This Article examines how the ele-
ments of defect and causation have fared as the body of strict
products liability case law has evolved.
In recent years a group of scholars in diverse fields of law has
illustrated how the development of legal doctrine perpetuates and
legitimates the existing economic and social systems.' In the field
of tort law, Professor Morton Horwitz has suggested that negli-
gence law developed in order to bolster a growing industrial capi-
talist economic order.9 He postulates that pre-existing strict liabil-
ity doctrine was supplanted by negligence so that industry could
grow without undue concern for liability costs.'0 Professor Richard
Abel, also writing about the tort compensation system, has demon-
strated that the existing tort system exhibits a lack of humanity by
putting a price tag on human suffering and that the system does
5. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
6. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (emphasis added).
7. Proof of damages, although part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in strict products
liability litigation, and defenses are beyond the scope of this article.
8. See, e.g., D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1975) (criminal law); Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980) (race discrimination); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (labor law);
Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court
Jurisprudence, 62 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984) (sex discrimination).
9. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 ch. 3 (1977).
10. A scholarly debate surrounds the development of negligence law and its relation to
strict liability. Some commentators, including Horwitz, (id.), believe that pre-industrial era
law was characterized by strict liability. See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the His-
tory of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970). Others have found negligence
and strict liability strands coexisting throughout early common law history. See Schwartz,
Tort Law and The Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE
L.J. 1717 (1981). Another view argues that the pre-industrial era was committed to a "no
liability" approach. See Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Rein-
terpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981).
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not truly help the victims of accidents.11 Abel points out that no
amount of money can truly make a person whole. Yet the tort sys-
tem perpetuates a mythology that high damage awards remedy the
victim's suffering and that by so doing somehow take care of the
problem of safety.1"
This Article examines California strict products liability law in
light of these critiques.' s Part I of the Article discusses the case
law relating to defect and shows how the developing doctrine is
similar to negligence law. Part II examines the evolution of causa-
tion case law, which has not been unique to strict products liability
and therefore would not be distinguished from negligence. The Ar-
ticle's thesis is that the development of strict products liability has
not helped consumers as the California courts have suggested. The
doctrine does not emphasize the importance of prevention of in-
jury. The proof requirements placed upon the injured plaintiff are
not very different from the plaintiff's burdens under negligence
law. Rather, the evolution of the doctrine merely has created the
illusion that the tort system is responding to the needs of those
injured by products. The myth that strict products liability bene-
fits consumers at the expense of manufacturers should be
dispelled.
I. THE DEFECT REQUIREMENT
To establish a prima facie case of strict products liability, a
plaintiff must show that the product which caused injury was de-
fective.'4 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.1 5 implied that a
defective product was one that was "unsafe for its intended use." 6
11. Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 695 (1982); Abel, Torts, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 185 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Abel, A Critique of
American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J. L. & Soc'¥ 199 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Abel, A Critique].
12. See Abel, A Critique, supra note 11, at 203.
13. The Article examines California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal cases. These
cases are only the tip of the litigation iceberg, because many cases settle, end in trial, or
terminate in some manner short of appellate review. Nevertheless, appellate decisions com-
prise the body of law that attorneys can cite in seeking early dispute resolution and this
precedential value has an ideological impact. Appellate cases are also reported in the media
and contribute to the mythology about law that is available to the general public. From the
appellate decisions an ideology based on doctrinal development emerges.
14. See supra text accompanying note 6.
15. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
16. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
[Vol. 19
HeinOnline  -- 19 U.S.F. L. Rev.  142 1984-1985
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Greenman court did not define precisely how unsafe the prod-
uct had to be because of the defect to enable an injured plaintiff to
maintain a strict products liability suit.
A. Defining Defect as an Unreasonably Dangerous
Product
In an attempt to clarify the defect requirement, lower level
courts"7 adopted the definition of defect set forth in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ' but the Restatement defi-
nition did not serve this clarifying function. The Restatement de-
fined a defective condition as one "not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."1
"Unreasonably dangerous" was defined as "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics. 2 0 These Restatement defi-
nitions injected the negligence notion of reasonableness into strict
products liability. The notion of reasonableness diluted the strict
liability notion of responsibility for defect. It gave a manufacturer
permission to injure as long as the manufacturer was reasonable in
so doing. The use of a reasonableness standard burdened the plain-
tiff with proof problems similar to those that the California Su-
preme Court had said it was seeking to avoid when it adopted
strict products liability.
The Restatement definitions also borrowed from warranty law
the idea of focusing on the expectations of a hypothetical con-
sumer, instead of the particular plaintiff who was injured.2 1 The
17. See the discussion in Foglio v. Western Auto Supply Inc., 56 Cal. App. 3d 470, 473-
74, 128 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546-47 (1976).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
19. Id. comment g.
20. Id. comment i.
21. The court had warned in Greenman that:
[R]ules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the
needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturer's liability to those injured by its defective products unless those
rules also serve the purpose for which such liability is imposed. "The remedies
of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of
the law of sales."
59 Cal. 2d at 63, 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 902, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (quoting Ketterer v. Armour
& Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). Justice Traynor, the author of the Greenman opin-
ion, criticized the Restatement test for this reason in a speech he made in 1965.
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introduction of hypothetical consumer expectations into strict
products liability injected into the jurisprudence the image of
plaintiffs as fungible commodities, interchangeable, with a conse-
quent loss of individuality. The particular injured plaintiff is
viewed not as a human being who is hurt, but rather as a part of a
formula. Thus the Greenman strict liability formulation, which
was strongly pro-consumer, was undercut by the Restatement no-
tions of reasonableness borrowed from negligence law and con-
sumer expectations borrowed from warranty law.
The California Supreme Court showed its own ambivalence to-
ward defining defect in 1970 in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co. 22
where it used both the Greenman and section 402A definitions of
defect. The next year, in Jiminez v. Sears & Roebuck Co.,23 the
court recognized the difficulty facing litigants pursuing a strict
products liability action without a more precise definition of
defect.
The Jiminez court pointed out that the term "unreasonably
dangerous" defect had not been defined in Pike, whereas the fac-
tors used in the balancing test for negligence were clearly deline-
ated.24 Plaintiff Jiminez had requested jury instructions on both
strict products liability and negligence. The Court noted:
Over the years a considerable body of law has been developed
as to negligence permitting definitive instructions based upon
tested and settled principles; whereas the same development
has not as yet occurred with respect to the more recent doc-
trine of strict liability in tort . . . . In many cases, a plaintiff
might well be benefited by resort to settled negligence princi-
Emphasis on . .. what the Restatement views as commonly contemplated
characteristics should not afford a basis for charging the consumer with as-
sumption of the risk of the harm some products cause. Were a consumer
deemed to assume all commonly known risks, we would come full circle round
to the problems generated by the disclaimer of warranty in the implied war-
ranty cases.
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363, 371 (1965).
22. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
23. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
24. Id. at 384, 482 P.2d at 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 772. The clear delineation of factors
balanced in the negligence decision does not mean that the negligence decision itself is for-
mulaic. The ideology of law promotes the understanding that legal rules lead to a carved-in-
stone certainty. The reality of negligence decisions is not so predictable.
[Vol. 19
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ples and approved jury instructions.2 5
Thus even the court that had adopted strict products liability
seemed to question the usefulness of the doctrine compared with
"settled" negligence principles.
The court finally rejected the Restatement's "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Co. 26 because it
"burdened the plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of
negligence."27 However, the court did not provide a substitute defi-
nition for defect.2 8
After Cronin, trial and appellate court judges continued to use
the term "unreasonably dangerous" in spite of Cronin.2 9 Plaintiffs
tried to appeal cases where jury instructions including the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" were followed by unfavorable verdicts,
but would lose where they had "invited error" by asking for such
an instruction. Some trial and appellate judges drafted their own
definitions of defect.3' At least one definition devised by a trial
25. Id. at 384, 482 P.2d at 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
26. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
27. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
28. This left plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts in a quandary. One appellate court
decision, Cavers v. Cushman Motors, 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), noted
that "the lack of 'definitive precedent' on the concept of defect . . . caused the Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions to avoid issuing jury instructions defining either 'defect' or
defective condition .... " Id. at 345, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
29. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978) (used at trial court, reversed by California Supreme Court) (see infra text accompa-
nying notes 34-41); Foglio v. Western Auto Supply, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 3d 470, 128 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1976) (used at trial court, reversed by appellate court); Balido v. Improved Mach., 29
Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1972) (used by both trial and appellate courts).
30. See, e.g., Henderson v. Harnischfeger, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1974); Correll v. Clark Equip., 76 Cal. App. 3d 548, 143 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1978); Dosier v.
Wilcox-Crittenden Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1975).
31. In Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973), a nine year old
boy knocked over a paint can filled with gasoline, which flowed towards a gas-fired
waterheater. The gas ignited and the boy was severely burned. The court found no defect in
the water heater, but found that the water heater had been installed in a "defective loca-
tion," the garage floor. Id. at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
[I]t seems clear that the doctrine [of strict liability in tort] may be applied
where, as the proximate result of a defect in the design of a. residential build-
ing, and installation of an article pursuant thereto, injury results to a human
being. It is possible that an article or a machine may function safely in one
location in the design but not another.
Id.
In Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974), the court
wrote:
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court judge was held reversible error.2 One appellate court, echo-
ing Jiminez, adopted the position that plaintiffs would be better
off suing under negligence than strict products liability.3
[W]hile defective design is an amorphous and elusive concept once we have
progressed beyond the idea of fitness for intended use, its contours certainly
include the notion of excessive preventable danger. When an automobile's fuel
tank has been located in a position relatively more hazardous than others, ...
when the danger is well-known to the designers, and when the tank could have
been readily relocated in a safer position, a jury could conclude that the loca-
tion of the fuel tank made the design of the automobile defective.
Id. at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
In Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976), the court
stated:
[T]he reasonableness of an alternative design - whether the design can actually
be produced, the materials for production are available, the costs are not pro-
hibitive, etc. - is a factor to be considered in determining whether the design
which was actually used can be characterized as defective . . . . Requiring an
injured plaintiff who seeks damages against a manufacturer on the basis of
strict liability in tort for a defective design to show that alternative designs for
a product could reasonably have been developed does not enlarge plaintiff's
burden of proof. An injured plaintiff has always had the burden to provide the
existence of the defect. The reasonableness of alternative designs, where a de-
sign defect is claimed, is part of that burden.
Id. at 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
The trial court in Baker had defined defect as:
A defective design is one which proximately causes or increases foreseeable and
unnecessary injury to the user or to another in the course of the intended use
of the product if the product can reasonably be designed and produced for its
intended purpose without causing or increasing injury to the user or to
another.
Id. at 715, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 748. See also Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d
533, 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 (1976) (outlining another design defect definition).
32. Heap v. General Motors Corp., 66 Cal. App. 3d 824, 136 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977). The
trial court judge in Heap ruled that there was no defect in the car's accelerator, based upon
his own ownership of a similar make of car, and the fact that several of these cars had not
caused problems.
[W]e know that there is such a thing as judicial knowledge, and I cannot ignore
the fact that I know that there are an awful lot of Buick Le Sabres on the road
... I can't ignore the fact that for the past eight years I have been driving
an Oldsmobile that has a very similar type of accelerator . . . . Now, to hold
that this is defective just doesn't make sense to me. It's operating in tens of
thousands of automobiles without incident.
Id. at 830 n.3, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08. The appellate court reversed, stating: "This is not
the test for determining a defective product. The mere fact that there are thousands of
similar accelerator pedals in use does not make the one in plaintiff's case any less defective
if it is poorly designed and causes injury in an accident." Id.
33. Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828, 832 (1977), va-
cated, 84 Cal. App. 3d 907, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978).
()
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B. Alternative Tests for Defining Defect
In an attempt to fill the definitional void, the court in Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co."4 set out two alternative tests by which a
plaintiff could prove that a product design was defective. Under
the first test, plaintiff must show that the product "failed to per-
form as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. '3 5 The court noted,
however, that consumer expectations should not be the only test
because "in many situations, the consumer would not know what
to expect, because he would have no idea how safely the product
could be made." 6 The court therefore added a second choice.
Under this test, a plaintiff could prevail "if the plaintiff proves
that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove . . .that on balance the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design. '3 7
1. The Consumer Expectation Alternative
The Barker court noted that the first choice, the consumer ex-
pectations test, was similar to the Uniform Commercial Code war-
ranties of merchantibility and fitness for a particular purpose."s
This test also resembled section 402A's definition of an unreasona-
bly dangerous product as one that is more dangerous than a con-
sumer with ordinary common knowledge would expect. 9
34. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). The Barker court felt that a
special test needed to be devised for design defects, as opposed to manufacturing defects
because:
In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because
a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result
or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line . . . .A de-
sign defect, by contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the injury-
producing product with the manufacturer's plans or with other units of the
same product line, since by definition the plans and all such units will reflect
the same design.
Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (quoting Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 829 (1973)).
37. 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
38. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
39. See supra note 23.
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The California Supreme Court, in Cronin, ° had rejected using
the Restatement's viewpoint of the "ordinary" consumer in deter-
mining safety expectations and product defectiveness. The court
had reasoned that if an ordinary consumer would have expected
the defective condition of a product, the seller might escape strict
liability.41 The adoption of a consumer expectation test poses sev-
eral issues for consumers, including definition of that expectation
and the reintroduction of negligence and warranty doctrine into
strict products liability.
Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. 42 illustrates some of the problems
inherent in a consumer expectation approach. There the court
found that a fencer risked receiving an eye injury because he could
not have reasonably expected that the products used in the sport
would be as safe as other products.4 The Garcia court, citing
Greenman, wrote that the purpose of strict products liability is to
have manufacturers pay the cost of injuries rather than consumers
who are "powerless to protect themselves."4 4 The opinion con-
cluded "[iut is difficult to perceive a person choosing to engage in
the sport of sabre fencing as one powerless to protect himself." '45
Justice Traynor had envisioned that strict products liability
should apply even to products whose "norm is danger. '4 6 Garcia
negated such a possibility, for it implied that persons engaged in
dangerous activities somehow have more power to protect them-
selves from injuries than other consumers or at least have different
expectations about safety, and hence do not deserve the protection
of strict products liability.47
40. 8 Cal. 3d'121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
41. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
42. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
43. In Garcia, the plaintiff was injured when an unusually sharp blade pierced his face
mask. The court found that the blade was defective, but denied recovery to the plaintiff
because he could not prove which of two manufacturers produced the blade. The court
found that the mask was not defective because the manufacturer could not have foreseen
that an unusually sharp blade would be used. The court also stated that "fencing is a form
of combat, a dangerous sport. The fencing rules provide that fencers assume the risk of
injury during a bout." Id. at 878, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849. "[T]he risk to which we refer is not a
form of contributory negligence but is conduct indicating an awareness that the available
physical protection reasonably to be expected is much less than that to be expected from
some other product." Id. at 878 n.2, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849 n.2.
44. Id. at 878 n.2, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849 n.2.
45. Id.
46. Traynor, supra note 21, at 368.
47. It is unlikely that an ordinary consumer would expect a defective blade to be used
[Vol. 19
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The California Supreme Court interpreted the Barker "con-
sumer expectations" language in Campbell v. General Motors
Corp.48 The plaintiff in Campbell was a sixty-two year old woman
who was injured when the bus on which she was riding made a
sharp turn throwing her to the floor. She contended that the bus
was defectively designed because it did not have handrails or
guardrails which she could have reached for to avoid falling. In re-
versing the trial court's ruling for the defendant, the court held
that the lack of rails presented sufficient evidence to reach a jury
concerning design defect which did not meet ordinary consumer
safety expectations.4 9 The court noted that "in determining
whether a product's safety satisfied the first prong of Barker, the
jury considers the expectations of a hypothetical reasonable con-
sumer, rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case. '50
This definition, by equating the Barker consumer expectation test
to the section 402A unreasonably dangerous test for determining
product defect, further undercut the Cronin directive to downplay
consumer expectations.
In adopting the standard of the hypothetical ordinary con-
sumer which it had previously rejected, the court has interjected
elements of both negligence and warranty into strict products lia-
bility. The court thus makes possible the absolution of manufac-
turers from liability when there is a finding that an ordinary con-
sumer would have expected the product to be less safe than the
injured plaintiff claims he expected it to be. One of the avowed
benefits of strict products liability, to make proof easier for plain-
tiffs, is eroded. Proof by a plaintiff, therefore, is no easier in a
strict products liability action than in a negligence action, because
litigants have no way of determining how much danger a court will
find an ordinary consumer to have expected. This standard can,
and has, led to unjust results, for it does not take into account
youth,51 inexperience, and mental and emotional disabilities.
in a fencing match, any more than such a consumer would expect that a sky-diver's para-
chute wouldn't open, or that a race car driver's tires would blow out in mid-race. Persons
involved in dangerous sports have no different safety expectations. They might expect that
they would be injured through their own carelessness or lack of experience, but not that the
equipment they use, or that their opponents use, will malfunction.
48. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
49. Id. at 126, 649 P.2d at 232, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
50. Id. at 126 n.6, 649 P.2d at 233 n.6, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.6.
51. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Anthony Indus., Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 506, 167 Cal. Rptr. 292
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This standard also creates uncertainty for plaintiffs. Each case
will raise an issue as to how long a product must be on the market
before knowledge of its dangers will be attributed to the injured
plaintiff as being the knowledge of an "ordinary" consumer. Safety
is not thereby being promoted. The dilution of strict products lia-
bility doctrine with negligence and warranty principles undercuts
the goal of compensating injured plaintiffs, while maintaining the
illusion that the doctrine benefits them.
The Barker court acknowledged that the consumer expecta-
tion test was problematic. It stated:
The flaw in the Restatement's analysis, in our view is that it
treats such consumer expectations as a "ceiling" on a manufac-
turer's responsibility under strict liability principles, rather
than as a "floor". .... [Past California decisions establish
that at a minimum a product must meet ordinary consumer
expectations as to safety to avoid being found defective.2
For this reason, the Barker court offered as an alternative the risk-
benefit balancing test.53 However, this balancing test, like the con-
sumer expectation test, provides an opportunity for manufacturers
to escape liability, and it is not an easy test for consumers to meet.
2. The Balancing and Burden-Shifting Alternative
There is very little difference between the negligence and
Barker balancing tests other than the difference in placement of
the burden of proof. The same basic factors are evaluated under
both. The factors which the Barker court stated that the jury
should consider in balancing the benefits of the design against its
risks are: "(1) the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged
design, (2) the likelihood that such danger would occur, (3) the
(1980) (18 month-old boy was charged with knowledge of a patent defect-the lack of a
fence around a swimming pool).
52. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426 n.7, 573 P.2d at 233 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7 (empha-
sis added).
53. The alternative test for liability under Barker provides that once the plaintiff
proves that the product's design was the proximate cause of his injury, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that the product is not defective by showing that the benefits of the
design outweighed its risks. A plaintiff, suing under negligence, carried the burden of proof.
20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The negligence burden could prove
an insurmountable obstacle in obtaining access to information on alternative designs and
their feasibility.
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mechanical feasibility of a safer design, (4) the financial cost of an
improved design and (5) the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative de-
sign."54 In an action for negligent design, a jury must determine
whether a manufacturer used "reasonable care" in designing the
product. To determine this, the jury weighs "(1) the likelihood of
harm to be expected from a machine with a given design and (2)
the gravity of the harm, against (3) the burden of precaution which
would be effective to avoid the harm. '55 The only difference be-
tween the Barker test and a negligence balancing test is that the
Barker case elaborates on the factors involved in determining the
burden of precaution necessary to avoid the harm. The tests are
not truly distinct, although the court asserts that they are.
The Barker court argued that its balancing test was different
from the negligence test because "the jury's focus is properly di-
rected to the condition of the product itself, and not to the reason-
ableness of the manufacturer's conduct. '56 This distinction is arti-
ficial because decisions as to whether an improved design would be
too costly, would be mechanically feasible, or would adversely af-
fect the product or consumers are made by the manufacturer, not
by the product "itself." The Barker factors involve an evaluation
of the manufacturer's reasonable care just as the negligence factors
do. Two of the three factors in a negligent design case, the likeli-
hood of harm and the gravity of harm, focus on the product and its
capacity for danger. It is just as likely that juries in negligence
suits will focus on the product, as it is that juries in strict products
liability cases will focus on the manufacturer's conduct.
The Barker test specifically allows the manufacturer to justify
seriously injuring consumers if it can prove that to manufacture a
better design would be too costly. Juries in negligence cases may
balance costs against injuries, 5 but the Barker court has actually
legitimized injuries on this basis and has made such injuries an
acceptable part of the manufacturing process.
To shift the burden of proof under the Barker balancing test,
54. Id. at 431, 572 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
55. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629,
632; see also United States v. Carrol Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
57. Vandall, Design Defect in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict
Liability, 31 DEF. L.J. 516, 526-27 (1982).
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the plaintiff has the burden of proving first that there was a design
defect, and that the defect proximately caused his or her injury. In
contrast, the Cronin court required a plaintiff to show only these
elements to prevail under strict products liability. The Barker test
runs counter to Cronin by articulating a negligence balancing test
through which a manufacturer can avoid liability once the burden
of proof shifts. This negligence language burdens the plaintiff be-
cause, under Cronin, the plaintiff would have prevailed simply by
proving that the design defect was the proximate cause of the
injury.5
The Barker balancing test leaves several issues unresolved.
The balance between a manufacturer's desired margin of profit, on
the one hand, and the responsibility to produce a safe product re-
gardless of the cost of ensuring safety, on the other, is not ad-
dressed. Nor is the question of how much testing a manufacturer
must conduct before marketing a product resolved. These issues
are significant for a system which has safety of consumers as a
goal. Purportedly, the California decisions have sought to deter the
marketing of defective products. Yet, the court has not addressed
those cost-related issues that bear on safety. These court decisions
do not motivate manufacturers to reduce accidents.
The Barker decision also did not explain how a plaintiff might
prove the existence of a design defect. The fact that the product
injured the plaintiff had been held insufficient to establish a de-
fect.59 In Garcia, the court of appeal interpreted Barker as still
requiring the plaintiff to prove that there was an alternative safer
design before the burden of proof could be shifted to the defen-
dant. The Garcia opinion stated: "Barker v. Lull. . .did not alter
the need for demonstrating the availability of reasonable alterna-
tive design, but simply shifted to defendant the burden of proving
58. Amici criticized that "any instruction which directs the jury to 'weigh' or 'balance' a
number of factors, or which sets forth a list of competing considerations for the jury ...
introduces an element which 'rings of negligence' into the determination of defect, and con-
sequently is inconsistent with [the] decision in Cronin." See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 433, 573
P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The Barker court responded that the Cronin and Green-
man decisions had objected to burdening the injured plaintiff with proof of an element that
rang of negligence. However, the court stated that by shifting the burden of proof to the
manufacturer, the plaintiff's burden was lightened. Id.
59. See, e.g., Henderson v. Harnischfeger, 12 Cal. 3d 663, 676, 527 P.2d 353, 361, 117
Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1974); Barrett v. Atlas Powder, 86 Cal. App. 3d 560, 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 339,
342 (1978).
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the unreasonableness of requiring an alternative in terms of such
items as cost of producing the alternative product." 60 If the Garcia
decision is correct, the Barker risk-balancing test puts the plaintiff
at an even greater disadvantage than would a negligence action.
The plaintiff will have to gain access to manufacturing informa-
tion, just as he or she would under negligence, plus the Barker test
gives the manufacturer an opportunity to escape liability by prov-
ing that the alternative design offered by the plaintiff would be
unfeasible or too costly. Thus Barker makes explicit the notion
that a manufacturer can avoid liability where the safer alternative
design is too expensive.
The case development defining defect has not served the inter-
ests of consumer safety and of easing the injured plaintiff's burden
of proof-the reasons for adopting strict liability in the first place.
Justice Traynor's vision of strict products liability as a means of
ensuring compensation for injured plaintiffs by simplifying their
litigative burden has become a complex doctrine that does not
serve that goal. 1
In contrast to the defect requirement, the development of the
causation doctrine has ostensibly served to ease plaintiffs' proof
problems. However, that development has not been exclusive to
strict liability cases, suggesting that strict liability has not been the
boon to consumers that the court decisions have implied it would
be.
II. THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
The element of causation"5 is not unique to strict products lia-
bility cases. A plaintiff in a tort case based on intentional wrongdo-
ing or negligence, as well as on strict liability, carries the causation
burden of proof." The causation doctrine serves to perpetuate an
individualist ethic in the ideology of tort law because a plaintiff
can only recover when the named defendant tortfeasor is shown to
60. Garcia, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 879 n.3, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849 n.3.
61. Although his vision of strict products liability purported to simplify plaintiff's liti-
gative burden to ensure compensation, Justice Traynor did not approve of large recoveries
by plaintiffs based on a pain and suffering award. See, e.g., Seffert v. L.A. Transit, 56 Cal.
2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961).
62. Causation as used here includes both actual cause and proximate cause.
63. TORTS, supra note 2, at 263.
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have caused plaintiff's harm. 4 In modern tort law causation has
been separated into two elements-actual cause (or cause in fact)
and proximate cause (or legal cause).6 5 Actual cause is often de-
scribed as a factual decision 6 and proximate cause as a policy
question. 7 The term proximate cause (or legal cause) is also used
as an umbrella term to encompass both aspects of the causation
decision."
A. The Illusion of Causation
Several commentators have described how the doctrine of ac-
tual causation has been used to provide an illusion that the liabil-
ity decision is an objective one.6 9 Professor Wex Malone, who initi-
ated this approach to the subject, has suggested that the "skein of
fact and policy" is not so easily separated into two separate enti-
ties.70 The notion that the actual cause decision is an objective one
creates an illusion about the tort decision-making process and
tends to reinforce the notion of identifiable individual
responsibility.
Professor Horwitz has documented the efforts of nineteenth
century legal writers to maintain a doctrine of objective causation
in order to ensure that liability not be automatically assigned to a
"deep-pocket" capitalist defendant.7' He writes that the doctrine
of causation serves as a way to limit liability while simultaneously
denying the interdependency of society by focusing on an individ-
ual actor's responsibility.7 2 Horwitz concludes that without objec-
tive causation the "problem of assigning liability had become sim-
ply a question of the fairness of the distribution of risks. 73
64. But see infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
65. See Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
66. TORTS, supra note 2, at 264.
67. Id. at 273.
68. Id. at 264.
69. See, e.g., Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1960); Pe-
drick, Causation, The 'Who Done-It' Issue and Arno Becht, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 645; Thode,
The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L.
REV. 423 (1968).
70. Malone, supra note 69, at 60.
71. Horwitz, supra note 65, at 205-06.
72. Id. at n.10.
73. Id.
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Ironically, the individualist mythology of causation has "begun to
be transformed into a world of liability insurance" where the cost
of liability is shared by interdependent insureds.7 4
In addition to the actual cause decision, the proximate causa-
tion part of the causation question requires a policy decision as to
the fairness of holding defendant responsible for plaintiff's harm.
The fairness question arises in the context of unexpected injuries,75
unlikely sequences of events giving rise to those injuries,7 6 the fore-
seeability of the plaintiff," and shifting responsibility.7 8
The California strict products liability causation cases do not
deviate from the typical pattern in which the fairness of finding
defendant liable is debated using proximate cause words of art.7 9
The cases dispute sufficiency of evidence as to causation,8" foresee-
ability,8 ' burden of proof, 2 and subsequent injury in a hospital.83
They do not change the mythology of causation (articulated by
Horwitz) that causation must be attributable to an individual de-
fendant with no mention of any collective or interdependent re-
sponsibility between actors for liability to attach. This view of cau-
sation perpetuates the notion that the members of society function
as atomistic individuals who may become wrongdoers.8
74. Id. at 211.
75. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2nd Cir. 1970); McCahill v.
New York Transportation Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911).
76. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 A.C. 388
(known popularly as "Wagon Mound No. 1"); In re Arbitration between Polemis and Fur-
ness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
77. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
78. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1973).
79. The exception is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories discussed infra. See infra text ac-
companying notes 84-88.
80. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.; 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
81. See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr.
857 (1983).
82. See, e.g., Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d
193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
83. See, e.g., Campbell v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 51, 583 P.2d 121, 148 Cal. Rptr.
596 (1978). '
84. See Abel, A Critique, supra note 11, at 206.
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B. A Break From Traditional Causation Theory
The idea that liability ought only to attach to individual
wrongdoers was eroded by the 1980 California Supreme Court de-
cision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories." Plaintiff Sindell, a DES
daughter, sued eleven drug manufacturers for personal injuries.
Her suit, based on several alternative theories of liability, including
negligence and strict products liability, 6 was dismissed by the trial
court which found plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer
that had produced the DES to which she had been exposed.s7
The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal in a de-
cision which dispensed with the usual causation requirement that
plaintiff identify the specific defendant who manufactured the
DES which her mother had taken. The court held that each defen-
dant DES manufacturer would be liable for the portion of plain-
tiff's damages representing that defendant's share of the DES
market. 88
This decision marks a significant departure from typical tort
ideology. The interdependence of society's members is recognized,
in that drug companies can be held liable for each other's prod-
ucts, and in that plaintiff's inability ever to prove the identity of
the precise tortfeasor does not bar her recovery. The Sindell deci-
sion, however, is not limited to cases of strict liability. It was also a
negligence case and so this same short-circuiting of the causation
doctrine could occur in either a negligence or a strict liability sce-
nario. Therefore, the Sindell decision cannot be viewed as making
strict liability doctrine more pro-plaintiff than negligence doctrine.
Sindell has not been as significant in easing plaintiffs' burden
of proof as a reading of the case would suggest. In the five years
since it was decided, the Sindell decision has not had the practical
85. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
86. Other causes of action included violation of express and implied warranties, false
and fraudulent representations, misbranding of drugs in violation of federal law, conspiracy
and "lack of consent." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
87. Id. at 596, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
88. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 145, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The doctrine of market share
liability has been explained and critiqued elsewhere. E.g., Bays, The Market Share Theory:
Sindell's Contribution to Industry-wide Liability, 19 Hous. L. REV. 107 (1981); Connolly,
Market Share Liability and DES: Square Pegs in Round Holes, 13 CONN. L. REV. 777
(1981); Kors, Refining Market Share Liability - Sindell, 33 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1981); Mur-
ray, A Market Approach to DES Causation, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1179 (1981); Note, Market
Share Liability for DES, 60 NEB. L. REV. 432-49 (1981).
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impact of encouraging settlements based on market share liability.
Expert tort litigators agree that companies remain unwilling to set-
tle DES claims absent identification of the harm-causing drug
manufacturer. 9 Here again the court decision creates an image
that injured consumers are being assisted by the tort system. In
reality that care is illusory.
Conclusion
Professor Abel cites the evolution of tort law in the "choice of
negligence over strict liability" as support for the notion that
"[b]ecause capitalists have to maximize profit in a competitive
market, they must sacrifice the health and safety of others
.... ,'90 One can read Professor Abel as implying that the doctrine
of strict liability would not serve capitalists in the same way that
negligence could. Yet a tort compensation system operating on a
strict liability principle, as California's product liability system
does, remains susceptible to several of the criticisms Abel makes of
the negligence system. The manufacturer's motivation is to reduce
liability costs rather than accident costs."'
The creation of strict products liability does not create an
overriding interest in consumer safety. The time lag between the
marketing of a product and compensating an injured consumer
means that manufacturers still accrue profits. Consumption pat-
terns are not necessarily changed by the tort litigation system. The
product (later found defective) has already been purchased and is
in use by consumers who may be injured. A strict liability standard
does not introduce any standardization of product testing to en-
sure that only safe products are placed on the market. The exis-
tence of an after-the-fact compensation system, whether based on
strict liability or negligence, serves to lessen the concern for pre-
vention of accidents and refocuses the systematic concern on costs.
Perhaps most egregiously, the strict liability system creates the
myth that, through the progressiveness of the judicial system, in-
jured people are being taken care of, yet prevention of injury is
still relegated to an unimportant status.
89. Conversation with Nancy Hersh, Hersh & Hersh, in San Francisco (Feb. 21, 1985).
90. Abel, A Critique, supra note 11, at 199 (emphasis in original).
91. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981).
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California's strict liability doctrine has not emerged as a the-
ory dramatically different from negligence law. The proof of defect
requirement has evolved to require that plaintiffs litigate the same
issues that would be litigated under negligence doctrine, although
the shifting burden of proof does alter the plaintiffs' burden some-
what. In the causation arena, the Sindell decision could give plain-
tiffs an advantage, but that decision is not limited to strict product
liability cases. In significant ways tort cases based on strict product
liability and negligence remain disturbingly similar from the con-
sumer's perspective.
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